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UNTYING THE KNOT: THE COURSE AND
PATTERNS OF DIVORCE REFORM
Marriage is often viewed as a contractual relationship between
freely consenting individuals.1 Paradoxically, however, the state,
through its extensive regulation of the marital relationship, 2 has traditionally maintained a status as mandatory third-party beneficiary to
this most private of all "contractual" arrangements State regulation of
1 See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. R Li.LAW § 10 (McKinney 1964), which provides that marriage
"so far as its validity in law is concerned, continues to be a civil contract, to which the
consent of parties capable in law of making a contract is essential."
2 State regulation of marriage may be categorized as follows:
Pre-marital. All states require the parties to obtain a license before they may be
married. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. R.. LAw § 25 (McKinney 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.12
(1957). Many states impose a waiting period between the application for and issuance of
the license. See, e.g., MoNT. R1v. CODES ANN. § 48-149(3) (Supp. 1971) (five days). In addition, states frequently place substantive restrictions on whom a party may marry. These
restrictions are generally related to age (see, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 207, § 9
(1969)), prevention of incest (see, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 5 (McKinney 1964)), and
mental and physical infirmity (see, e.g., DL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1551(1), (5) (1953);
MASS. GE.N. LAws ANN. ch. 207, § 28A (1969)).
Marital Obligations. The state imposes several duties upon both husband and wife
during marriage. "The husband is to provide the family with food, clothing, shelter and
as many of the amenities of life as he can manage." H. CLARK, Tim LAw oF DoMTmc
RELATIONS IN THE UNTED STATES § 6.1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as CLARK]. The wife must
maintain the home and care for the children. Id. The husband is primarily responsible
for financial support of the children, although the wife may assume this responsibility
in the event of her husband's default. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 32 (McKinney 1964).
Termination of Marriage. States commonly profess concern over maintaining the
permanence of the marital relation and thus impose procedural and substantive impediments to divorce, See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 102 So. 2d 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
People ex rel. Doty v. Connell, 9 Ill. 2d 390, 137 N.E.2d 849 (1956); Dionne v. Dionne,
155 Me. 377, 156 A.2d 393 (1959). Extensive state regulation of divorce has resulted in a
number of legal and social problems (notes 25-34 and accompanying text infra), and
some states have recently embraced new approaches and attempted solutions (notes 35-67
and accompanying text infra).

3 See Sweigart v. State, 213 Ind. 157, 12 N.E.2d 134 (1938); French v. McAnarney, 290
Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935).
Although marriage is a religious as well as a civil institution, American courts have
regarded it as ultimately subject to civil control. CLARK § 2.2. The American legal
posture is evident in such decisions as Maynard v. Hill, 125 US. 190 (1888), in which
the Supreme Court upheld the legislative propriety of granting divorce where various
causes
would render the continuance of the marriage relation intolerable to the other
party and productive of no possible benefit to society. When the object of the
relation has been thus defeated . . . it is not perceived that any principle should
prevent the legislature itself from interfering and putting an end to the relation
in the interest of the parties as well as of society.
Id. at 205-06. See also Helfond v. Helfond, 53 Misc. 2d 974, 280 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct.
1967). Thus, despite traditional religious emphasis on the indissolubility of the marital
union (see, e.g., Mark 10:9), the Supreme Court in Maynard indicated that marriage should
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the marital relationship has most often been justified in terms of social
stability. Marital stability is viewed as a component of political and
economic stability, the harmonious family unit seemingly the microcosmic analogue to an internally stable and thus externally invulnerable
state. 4 Carried to its logical conclusion, such a view dictates rigid state
regulation and protection of the marital union, 5 and the erection of
substantial legal obstacles to marital dissolution.
Today the propriety of extensive state control over marriage is
under increasing attack.6 Striking down Virginia's antimiscegenation
statute, the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia7 established the constitutional status of marriage as a basic civil right, thereby subjecting
all state restrictions on marriage to new and potentially severe constitutional scrutiny. The reach of the Loving rationale has not yet been
determined and substantial problems of interpretation remain. For
example, when the Court gave constitutional protection to "marriage,"
apparently it was using the word with its traditional cultural connotations-as the monogamous, heterosexual, familial, and permanent
relationship that state regulations universally promote. Moreover,
some language in the case seemingly reaffirms the traditional view of
the propriety of state regulation. In any event, although Loving elenot continue when it no longer serves the interests of the parties or society. Cf. P. JACOBSON, AMmCAN MAiuAGE AND DIVORCE 89 (1959). The difficult problem, of course, is
to determine those situations in which social and private interests are no longer served
by marital continuation.
4 See W. FRIEDMANN, LAWv IN A CHANGING SOCIErY 210 (1959) (the family as a "community in miniature'); see also Note, Marriage, Contracts, and Public Policy, 54 HA~v. L.
Rv.473 (1941).
5 In Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888), the Court noted that "[m]arriage, as
creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do with the morals and
civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject to the control
of the legislature."
Apparently the international community also sanctions governmental protection of
the "family," which presumably means a legal union: "The family is the natural and
fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State."
UNITED NATIONS UNIvERsAL DECLARATION OF HuIAN RIGm-s art. 16, G.a- Res. 217, U.N.

Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
6 See Drinan, The Loving Decision and the Freedom to Marry, 29 Omo ST. LJ. 358
(1968); cf. A. ToFFLER, FuTura SnocK 227-30 (1970); Selznick, Legal Institutions and Social Controls, 17 VAN. L. REV. 79, 80-82 (1963).
7 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
8 Marriage is "a social relation subject to the State's police power." Id. at 7, citing
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). The Court might have based its decision solely
on the racist motivation behind the antimiscegenation statute. See Drinan, supra note 6,
at 358-59. Rather, the Court declared that marriage was a "basic civil right of man," and
that the state must therefore show a "legitimate, overriding" state interest furthered by
the statute to avoid violating equal protection and due process. Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967). Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg,
J., concurring).
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vated the right to marry to the status of a constitutionally protected
liberty, termination of an unsuccessful marriage has never been regarded as a fundamental or basic civil right.9
A more severe threat than Loving to the present structure of
state regulation is posed by actual patterns of social and sexual behavior in contemporary American society-patterns which evidence
the failure of state regulation to achieve its goals. While states seek
to promote heterosexual monogamy, some Americans are finding the
emotional and psychological comforts which marriage has traditionally
provided in communal ° or homosexual" arrangements. While states
seek to promote stable "family units," the problems of overpopulation
have convinced many Americans that the real goals of any marriage
should be interpersonal rather than familial.1 Finally, while states
seek to promote the permanency of marriage, an ever-increasing number of Americans have shown a preference for terminating, rather
than prolonging, unsuccessful arrangements.' 8 Traditional state regulations, promoting goals that are out of harmony with contemporary
cultural mores, are being avoided by both citizens and the judiciary
and should be legislatively adjusted to reflect current social needs. 14
9 "There can be no such thing as a 'legal right' to a divorce vested in any married
person." Allen v. Allen, 73 Conn. 54, 46 A. 242 (1900). See Rogers v. Rogers, 399 S.W.2d
606 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Worthington v. District Ct., 87 Nev. 212, 142 P. 280 (1914).
10 See generally Palo Alto Tenants' Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal.
1970); W. HEDGEPEH, THE ALTERNATIV: COMmuNAL LIVE IN Naw Aam cA (1970); B. F.
SKINNER, WALDEN I (1948). A bill to legalize group marriage was recently introduced in
the Danish Parliament. A. ToFRs
, supra note 6, at 218.
11 In a recent case a Minnesota court refused to allow two males to marry. Baker v.
Nelson, - Minn. -, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971). One of the homosexuals, however, was
allowed to "adopt" his lover to establish a legal tie. See Trav, Sept. 6, 1971, at 50.
12 ,But see PAUL VI, HumANrE VrrA § 8 (1968): "[Husband and wife tend toward
the communion of their beings in view of mutual personal perfection to collaborate with
God in the generation and education of new lives." Cf. GROUP APPOINTED BY THE AcBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, PUTTING ASUNDER: A DIvoRcE LAw FOR CoNmMPoRARY Socmry 89
(1966)) [hereinafter cited as PTrIN ASUNDER].
's In 1970 approximately 715,000 American couples were divorced. BUREAu oF Tim
CENSUS, US. DEP't OF COMMERCE, STAT
CAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, at 60
(1971). One commentator asserts:
As human relationships grow more transient . . . . the pursuit of love
becomes, if anything, more frenzied ....
As conventional marriage proves itself
less and less capable of delivering on its promise of lifelong love . . . we can
anticipate open public acceptance of temporary marriages.

A. TOFFLER, supra note 6, at 228. For an analysis of economic and political reasons for
increased marital break-ups in the western world, see Davis, Statistical Perspective on
Marriage and Divorce, 272 ANNALS 9, 15-17 (1950).
14 "[I]f statutory law does not meet the current demand and need, it will be twisted
and circumvented, adapted and interpreted, so that its application suits the spirit of our
people rather than the letter of the law." Foster, Divorce Law Reform: The Choices for
the States, 42 STATE Gov'r 112, 118 (1969). See generally Jones, The Creative Power and
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Marriage is the most human of our institutions and is obviously
subject to human frailty and error. Although marriage involves a
great deal more than Kant's "reciprocal possession" of the sexual organs, 15 it is also something less than the relationship Tennyson saw
as "made in Heaven."' 6 In many cases marriages simply fail, either
through discord or disinterest; and when failure occurs termination
is the only recourse. Recognizing the unhealthy' 7 discrepancy between
law and practice in this area, some state legislatures have recently
attempted to reform their states' divorce laws." Unfortunately, they
have been loath to relinquish fully the ultimate control over the dissolution process they have traditionally exercised. 19 A corollary of
Loving's constitutional right to marry, however, should necessarily
be the right to terminate an unsuccessful marriage without unreasonable state delay, impediment, or moralism 2 °
I
FAULT DIvORcE

That divorce is sometimes unavoidable has long been recognized;21 the problem has been to define the justifying circumstances.
Function of Law in Historical Perspective, 17 VANo. L. REv. 185, 139-40 (1968); Rheinstein, Challenge and Response in Family Law, 17 VAN. L. Rzv. 239, 239-44 (1963).
15 I. KANr, TiH PmLOSOPHY OF LAW 110 (W. Hastie transl. 1887).
16 A. TENNYSON, Aylmer's Field, in COMPLerE WoP
191, 193 (1878).
17 Law loses its power and abdicates its ordering function when it loses touch
with the dynamics of social life. In aggravated situations, as when the essential
rules of a whole legal system are outmoded and the body of ordinary people
denied effective opportunity to change them, uncompromising opposition to
change can lead to political revolution and so to the loss of all stability in the
society.
Jones, supra note 14, at 140. See also Rheinstein, Trends in Marriage and Divorce Lawk
of Western Countries, 18 LAw & CoNrmM. PROB. 3, 19 (1953).
18 See notes 85, 51-53 & 73-77 and accompanying text infra.
19 See generally notes 35-63 and accompanying text infra.

20 There are veiled signs in recent cases that the judiciary may someday grant divorce a constitutionally protected status. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971),
the Supreme Court held invalid as applied to indigents a Connecticut statute (CONN.
GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-259 (1968)) requiring payment of court costs and fees as a condition of access to the state's divorce courts. The Court based its decision largely on the
individual's due process right to settle claims through the judicial process and on the
due process guarantee of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Id. at 376-79. The Court
also held that "a State may not . . . pre-empt the right to dissolve [the marital] . . .

relationship without affording all citizens access to the means it has prescribed for doing
so," since such right of access "is the exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a
fundamental human relationship." Id. at 383. In Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp.
1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971), a federal district court invalidated a Wisconsin statute requiring
two years residence for access to the state's divorce courts. These decisions may further
restrict the constitutional scope of state impediments to marital dissolution.
21 Maynard v. Hill, 125 US. 190 (1888); Braden v. Braden, 178 Cal. App. 2d 481, 3
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Since the state's traditional goal has been to preserve marriages, 22
most state divorce laws specify that only particular and demonstrable
kinds of acts will constitute "grounds" for divorce. 23 A divorce may
be granted only if a party can prove statutorily proscribed conduct
by his spouse while avoiding a finding of misconduct in his own activities. 24
Thus state divorce laws are generally "fault" oriented. By narrowly defining the category of acts justifying dissolution, the state seeks
to prevent divorce and thus to promote "stable" marital unions. Unfortunately, in both theory and practice the state's chosen means are unsuited to its implicit goals. Fault-oriented divorce law has been called
"obsolete, unrealistic, discriminatory, and sometimes immoral." 2 5 Objections to the fault system may be summarized as follows. 26
Statutory categories cannot possibly encompass all events that may
destroy a marital relationship nor, conversely, does the specified conduct per se necessarily evidence a need for the dissolution of a marriage.27 Specific acts such as adultery are often merely symptomatic of
28
other, more personal differences between dissatisfied marital partners.
Allocating fault in marital discord is a ridiculously simplistic approach and totally irrelevant to the consequences of marital dissoluCal. Rptr. 120 (4th Dist. 1960); Carroll v. Carroll, 135 Colo. 379, 311 P.2d 709 (1957); Sadleir
v. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 296 P.2d 278 (1956).
22 "The state by virtue of its interest in the continuance of the marriage has a definite interest in protecting the marriage relation even to the extent of encouraging dismissal of divorce actions." Case v. Case, 243 S.C. 447, 452, 134 SXE.2d 394, 896 (1964). See
Jolley v. Jolley, 216 Ga. 51, 114 S.E.2d 534 (1960); Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 165
P.2d 209 (1946); Wells v. Wells, 79 N.J. Super. 388, 191 A.2d 763 (Ch. 1963).
23 The most common grounds are adultery, desertion, and cruelty. E.g., N.Y.
Dom. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney Supp. 1971). See CLARK §§ 12.2-12.4.
24 See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 101 Ariz. 40, 415 P.2d 568 (1966), "[A divorce may be
granted only] when one party is guilty ....
Guilt is made the cause of divorce. What
form of guilt is specified by the 'grounds,' the overt acts or omissions which the law says
shall be sufficient cause-things we used to call sin." Alexander, The Follies of Divorce:
A Therapeutic Approach to the Problem, 36 A.B.A.J. 105, 107 (1950). An interesting
corollary to the notion that unilateral fault is necessary to dissolve a marriage is the idea
that bilateral fault will not justify dissolution. This is the doctrine of "recrimination."
See Lewis v. Lewis, 248 Ark. 261, 453 S.W.2d 22 (1970); Matakieff v. Matakieff, 246 Md. 23,
266 A.2d 887 (1967); see generally CLARK § 12.12.
25 Foster, supra note 14, at 112.
26 See generally Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 J.
F ALy L. 179 (1968); Goldstein S. Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model
Statute and Commentary, 3 FAmLY L.Q. 75 (1969); Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault
Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32 (1966); Walker, Beyond Fault: An Examination of
Patterns of Behavior in Response to Present Divorce Laws, 10 J. FAMILY L. 267 (1971);.
Note, Arizona Divorce Law: Time for a Better System, 1970 LAw & Soc L Oumt 621.
27 Note, supra note 26, at 627.
28 Cf. A. Tohmm, supra note 6, at 221-22.
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tion. Divorce should not be a retributive process. 29 The fault system
not only encourages perjury and hypocrisy, but also alienates the citizen from the law by demanding in some instances a public revelation
of intimate marital details.3 0 The state's refusal to grant a divorce
without a showing of fault does little to ameliorate the preexisting
tension in the marital relationship or to negate the reasons for which
at least one of the parties originally sought to dissolve the marriage.
By demanding that the parties assume the posture of combatants, the
fault system merely exacerbates the discord that first prompted the
divorce effort. 81
These objections are largely directed towards the administration
and consequences of the fault system; equally objectionable is its basic
theory. The fault system is premised on an unwarranted governmental
assumption of power. The state presumes to tell unhappy spouses
that termination of their marriage is never justified unless one spouse
has committed a specified offense against the marriage.3 2 Moreover,
the offense must be proven to the satisfaction of a state judicial tribunal, when it may well be that the parties themselves can most ably
judge the viability of their relationship.33 Fault-oriented divorce structures are not only outmoded but also represent arrogant state intrusion into private areas of interpersonal decision making. States should
eschew such involvement for a more humane, sophisticated role.3 4
II
REFoIlm WITHN TrI

FAULT SYSTEM

In recent years several states have attempted to modernize their
law of divorce by specifying certain theoretically "no-fault" grounds
for the dissolution of a marriage. An example is the ground of "in29 See Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 26, at 79-80.

30 Id. at 82; Note, supra note 26, at 628.

Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 26, at 81.
See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
33 This is not to say that such ancillary matters as alimony, support, child custody
and visitation, and property settlement are not within state judicial purview; only the
fundamental decision that a marriage is no longer viable seems outside the state's competence or moral authority. The state's regulation of divorce per se is the sole focus of
this note.
34 One observer suggests that stability in social relationships could perhaps be
achieved most effectively not by restricting divorce, but by preventing what will likely
turn out to be unhappy marriages. He would emphasize increased state premarital
regulation as a possible means of increasing the chances of marital success. Couch,
Marriage Law Reform-A Comment, 44 TuLANE L. REV. 251, 252 (1970). After Loving
such a state program might undergo careful constitutional scrutiny.
31
32
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compatibility." 85 However, integrating a theoretically no-fault ground
such as incompatibility into what remains fundamentally a fault system is somewhat inconsistent, 8 and may give rise to substantial problems.3 7 In addition, incompatibility statutes have not been uniformly
given a no-fault interpretation, since the judiciary frequently seems
reluctant to eliminate fault from consideration. 8 This reluctance is
understandable in view of the problems in defining incompatibility 9 and the clear fault orientation of the remaining divorce grounds.
Needless to say, if incompatibility were given a liberal definition, all
other grounds for divorce would become superfluous. Courts have,
therefore, often imposed an onerous burden of proof on a party alleging incompatibility.4"
A more common no-fault ground for divorce is exemplified by
35 E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.01

§ 22-7-1(8) (1953);
(1971).

36 For a discussion of underlying assumptions of the fault system, see notes 21-26
and accompanying text supra.
37 The doctrine of recrimination, for example, allows a court to deny divorce on
the ground that the parties are equally at fault. See note 24 suprm Thus, where the
doctrine is recognized in a particular jurisdiction, "incompatibility" would logically be a
defense to a suit for divorce based on the ground of "incompatibility." In Cate v. Cate,
53 Ark. 484, 14 S.W. 675 (1890), the court noted that "[u]nhappiness sufficient to render
the condition of both parties intolerable may arise from the mutual neglect of the conjugal duties; but when the parties are thus at fault, the remedy must be sought by them,
not in the courts, but in the reformation of their conduct." Id. at 487, 14 S.W. at
675.
In some jurisdictions the legislature has resolved the problem by specifically abolishing the doctrine of recrimination. See, e.g., Tax. FAM. CODE § 3.08 (1971). In other jurisdictions the issue remains unsettled. Compare Pavletich v. Pavletich, 50 N.M. 224, 174
P.2d 826 (1946), with Clark v. Clark, 54 N.M. 364, 225 P.2d 147 (1950). See generally
Orfield, Divorce for Temperamental Incompatibility, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 659, 666-69 (1954).
38 See, e.g., Paddock v. Paddock, 240 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1956), where a divorce was
"granted to the wife based upon incompatibility of the parties due to the fault of
the husband." Id. at 928.
"[Many courts simply cannot conceive of eliminating fault from consideration ....
T]he main difficulty is the impossibility of introducing incompatibility into the existing
fault-oriented framework ... since to a large extent they cannot stand together." Wadlington, supra note 26, at 52.
89 See, e.g., Burch v. Burch, 195 F.2d 799p 807 (3d Cir. 1952) (incompatibility not
"those petty quarrels and minor bickerings which are but the evidence of that frailty
which all humanity is heir to'); Hines v. Hines, 64 N.M. 377, 378, 328 P.2d 944, 945
(1958) (incompatibility results from a "total variance in taste, dispositions, ambitions,
mental attitudes and ideals'); Hughes v. Hughes, 363 P.2d 155, 158 (Okla. 1961) (incompatibility "imports more than a mere mental process or an after-thought conceived and

nurtured in the psyche of the complaining spouse").
40 See, e.g., Shearer v. Shearer, 356 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 940
(1966); Della Loggia v. Della Loggia, 264 A.2d 521 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970); Hughes v.

Hughes, 363 P.2d 155 (Okla. 1961).
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the increasing number of separation, or "living apart," statutes.4 1 Based
on the assumption that separation for a prescribed period of time is
sufficient evidence of marital breakdown to justify divorce, such statutes grant relief to spouses who are unwilling to demonstrate, or fabricate, other grounds. 42 In divorce proceedings based on separation,
the court accepts as determinative the decision of one or both of the
parties, as objectively evidenced by their physical separation, that the
marriage should be dissolved, without forcing them to justify that decision in any degree to the state. 43
Unfortunately, because of problems of application and their status
as addenda to existing fault structures, separation statutes do not constitute a satisfactory solution to the problem of divorce reform. Inevitably there is a judicial disposition to inject fault notions into
theoretically no-fault proceedings.44 There are diverse interpretations
41 See, e.g., FIA. STAT. Adi.

§ 61.041 (Supp. 1971) (two years); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16,
REv. STAT. § 125.010(9) (1969) (one year).

§ 24 (Supp. (1971) 18 months); NEv.

This discussion does not include the "desertion" ground which appears in various
state codifications, since that ground is generally construed to require "wilifull" and
"obstinate" abandonment on the part of a spouse. See Antrim v. Antrim, 169 Md. 418, 181
A. 741 (1936); Warner v. Warner, 54 Mich. 492, 494 (1884); Bond v. Bond, 252 S.C. 363,
166 S.E.2d 302 (1969). Some separation statutes make a divorce action available only to
the "innocent" partner, although the parties have lived apart for the specified period.
See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-47 (1959). Usually, however, either spouse may bring the

action and the separation need not have been voluntary on the part of both spouses.
See, e.g., Mason v. Mason, 209 Va. 528, 165 S.E.2d 392 (1969). For a discussion of state
variations of living apart statutes and an analysis of the degree to which such enactments
reflect no-fault criteria, see Wadlington, supra note 26, at 57-64.
42 There are no adequate statistics on the number of divorces based on collusion
between the parties, since the deceit is usually uncovered only when one of the spouses
wishes to stop the action.
43 The degree of judicial interference in a separation divorce may, however, vary.
For example, many separation statutes allow for divorce at the request of either spouse,
and do not mention fault as a possible defense to the action. See, e.g., VT. SrAT. ANN. tit.

15, § 551(7) (Supp. 1971). Under such statutes most courts have held that the fault of the
party seeking the divorce is irrelevant if the parties have lived apart for the statutorily
prescribed period; other courts have held that although a party has conformed to the
living apart requirement, he may still be denied a divorce if the separation may be
considered to be his "fault." See Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 502 (1967).
44 For example, the North Carolina living apart statute allows for the dissolution
of a marriage "on the application of either party, if and when the husband and wife have
lived separate and apart for one year," with no specific requirement that the separation
be voluntary or that the party seeking dissolution be without fault. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 50-6 (1966). However, although the party seeking divorce need not establish that he is
in any way an injured party (see, e.g., Overby v. Overby, 272 N.C. 636, 158 S.E2d 799,
802 (1968) (dictum)) and in some cases has not been denied a divorce despite his own
fault (see, eg., Long v. Long, 206 N.C. 706, 175 S.E. 85 (1934)), North Carolina courts
still maintain that "abandonment" is an affirmative defense to an action for divorce under
the section. E.g., Eubanks v. Eubanks 273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968). Cf. notes 38 &
41-43 supra.
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as to what constitutes "living apart" and "continuous separation," 45
and a requirement that the separation be without cohabitation may
have the effect of actually hindering attempts at reconciliation. 4
Furthermore, the specified duration of the separation period 47 presents
problems to those who desire to terminate their marriage immediately.
Although there seems to be a general tendency in recent years to
shorten the required separation period, 48 variances among state statutes may promote "migratory divorce" as a means to avoid prolonged
continuation of an otherwise indissoluable marriage. 49 Alternately,
where both separation and fault grounds are available in a jurisdiction,
a party may elect to proceed on a fault ground, real or fabricated,
to expedite the dissolution process. 50
Incompatibility and separation statutes reflect a shift in the state's
conception of marriage. No longer are many states insisting that only
a finding of specific fault will justify the dissolution of a hollow legal
relationship which has outlived the personal relationship upon which
it was founded. Unfortunately, the piecemeal process of attaching nofault legislation to existing fault structures has weakened the effective45 Compare Hawkins v. Hawkins, 191 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1951), and Hurd v. Hurd,
179 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1949), with Gross v. Gross, 265 Ala. 58, 89 So. 2d 737 (1956), and
Ratliff v. Ratliff, 312 Ky. 450, 227 S.W.2d 989 (1950).
46 Wadlington, supra note 26, at 75-76. Some living apart statutes specify that

separation must be without cohabitation. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp.
1971). Since such a requirement would cover a single act of intercourse as well as a lengthy
resumption of the marital relationship, it would seem to discourage attempts at reconciliation. See Smith v. Smith, 257 Md. 263, 262 A.2d 762 (1970). A meaningful interpretation of cohabitation would perhaps consider the parties' intent and the ultimate duration
of the attempted reconciliation before holding that the required statutory period is
interrupted. Wadlington, supra note 26, at 76.
47 In no state is the statutory period less than one year. Wadlington, supra note 26,
at 77-78.
48 See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.06 (1971). This reduced from seven to three

years the statutory separation requirement.
49 See generally CLARK § 11.1, at 285. Various state laws, because of their rigidity or
narrowness, may prompt individuals to seek divorce in other jurisdictions. In 1965 it was
estimated that approximately 11% of American divorces were "migratory." Drinan, What
Are the Rights of the Involuntary Divorcee? Reflections on Divisible Divorce, 53 KY. L.J.
209, 213 (1965). Attempts by jurisdictions to deny access to their divorce courts to short
term residents are of questionable constitutionality. For example, in Wymelenberg v.
Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971), the court applied the "right to travel" rationale
of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and struck down a two-year residence requirement for access to the divorce courts of that state. See note 20 supra.
50 "Of the jurisdictions having a combination of separation period grounds and
fault grounds without separation periods, most have a much higher percentage of decrees
granted on the basis of fault than on separation periods." Comment, Divorce ReformOne State's Solution, 1967 DuE .J.956, 965 n.58. See generally Bodenheimer, supra
note 26, at 208.
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ness of this conceptual shift and has resulted in cumbersome and
52
inconsistent divorce laws. For these reasons, the California5 ' and Iowa
5
3
legislatures have totally revised their states' divorce laws, attempting
not only to eliminate all taint of fault from the proceedings but also
to incorporate a more realistic view of the marital relationship.
III
THE BR

AKowN STANDARD

California couples desiring a divorce now need only show "irreconcilable differences" which have caused an "irremediable breakdown of the marriage." 54 As a general rule, specific acts of misconduct,
so critical under the fault system, may not be pleaded or introduced
into evidence. 5 Iowa couples may dissolve their marriage by showing
that there has been a sufficient "breakdown" of the relationship so
that "the legitimate objects of matrimony have been destroyed and
there remains no reasonable likelihood that the marriage can be
preserved."' 5 6
The recent enactments in California and Iowa evidence a new
degree of governmental respect for the difficult interpersonal decision
of the parties and an awareness of the sociological and psychological
subtleties involved in marital failure. 57 The comprehensive reforms
of these states have avoided, at least to some degree, the pitfalls inherent in incorporating no-fault grounds into a fundamentally faultbased structure. However, disturbing vestiges of the fault system are
evident in both states' reforms. For example, neither state has been
willing to abandon the adversary format in divorce proceedings;5 8
the marital partners retain their gladiatorial roles. In addition, judicial
determination of the existence of "irreconcilable differences" or of "a
51 CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970).
52 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.10-.34 (Supp. 1971).

53 For a comparison of the new laws with former divorce statutes in these states, see
CAL. Cv. CODE § 4506 (West 1970) (historical note); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.1 (Supp. 1971)
(table).
54 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4506(1) (West 1970).
55 Id. § 4509. But see note 60 and accompanying text infra.
56 IOwA CODE ANN. § 598.17 (Supp. 1971). See generally Peters, Iowa Reform o
Marriage Termination, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 211 (1971).
57 For example, neither California nor Iowa use the word "divorce" in their reform
statutes, but instead use the phrase "dissolution of marriage," presumably in an effort
to avoid "fault" connotations.
58 See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4508-09 (West 1970); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 598.7, .10, .17
(supp. 1971).
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breakdown of the marriage" may often involve an analysis of the same
types of conduct that would have constituted grounds for divorce
under the old fault system.59 Under the California Code, "evidence
of specific acts of misconduct" are "improper and inadmissible." This
provision, however, does not apply when such evidence is deemed
necessary by the court to "establish the existence of irreconcilable
differences." 60
The emphasis of both the California and Iowa reforms is clearly
on the existence of marital failure rather than upon its underlying
reasons. Yet both states have consciously retained the authority to obstruct divorce and have thus remained the final arbiters of the considered decision of the parties. The Iowa reform provides for minimum
waiting periods and for marital counseling in an effort toward reconciliation.61 California courts are authorized to continue the proceedings if there is a "reasonable possibility of reconciliation.16 2 Indeed,
the drafters of the California statute specifically stipulated that the
reform was not intended to allow the termination of a marriage "with' 63
out any effective intervention by society.
Although theoretically the breakdown standard underscores the
uniqueness of each marital relationship,64 there is a danger that its
application may entail serious state intrusions into the privacy of the
50 For example, an Iowa judge experienced in the preexisting fault structure might
well consider adultery or cruelty by one spouse as a relevant fact indicating an irremediable "breakdown" of the marriage. Cf. notes 38 & 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
Arguably, because "breakdown" statutes represent a totally new concept in the area
of divorce, there will be less tendency on the part of judges to read fault notions into
their administration.
60 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4509 (West 1970). California has specifically defined "irreconcilable differences" as "those grounds which are determined by the court to be substantial
reasons for not continuing the marriage and which make it appear that the marriage
should be dissolved." Id. § 4507. One California judge, however, has indicated that he
intends to ignore that portion of section 4509 which allows the court discretion to hear
testimony regarding fault. Saul, Proof of a No-Fault Divorce Case, 45 LAB. Bur .99,
126-27 & n.42 (1970) (remarks of Judge MacFaden).
61 IOwA CODE ANN. §§ 598.16, .19 (Supp. 1971). In addition, in certain cases Iowa imposes a one-year residence requirement for access to its divorce courts (id. § 598.6), a
questionable restriction after Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
Notes 20 & 49 supra.
62 CAL. Civ. CODE § 4508(a) (West 1970). See also id. § 4505.
63 CraroRNI
GovERNoR's COMM'N ON THE FAamY, RErORT (1966), reprinted in M.
PAur.sEN, W. WADUNTON & J. GOEBEL, CAsEs AND MATERLUS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS

507, 509 (1970).
64 By substituting the subjective "breakdown" criterion for objective fault criteria,
Iowa and California have imposed upon the judge the duty to investigate individually the
details of each marriage. Individualized treatment, however, does not necessarily equal
just treatment. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text infra.
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marriage. Commentators have pointed to the nonjusticiability of the
breakdown standard.6 5 Even assuming that a court can determine when
breakdown has occurred, the investigation accompanying such a subjective determination may involve an examination of marital intimacies unparalleled under traditional divorce laws.6 6 In addition, there
are no integral limitations on judicial discretion as there are under
living apart statutes or traditional fault systems. The emphasis on
conciliation procedures may result in a well meaning judge needlessly
thwarting the express desire of the parties to terminate their marriage
immediately, while the judge predisposed to deny divorce has ample
latitude to do so. 67 Moreover, diverse judicial interpretations of the
breakdown standard at the trial court level may result in the formulation of a set of appellate court rules on permissible indices of breakdown. Parties may again, as under traditional divorce laws, be forced
to allege and prove specific acts of misconduct or even tailor circumstances to fit judicially defined breakdown situations.
While it is perhaps premature to speculate on the exact consequences of breakdown reforms, it seems clear that they do not constitute a complete departure from the fault tradition or from the concept
of the state as final arbiter of the divorce decision. The California
and Iowa reforms, although praiseworthy, fail to provide the ultimate
accommodation of individual needs and state authority and may in
practice even perpetuate the intrusive state role that has characterized
previous divorce systems.
65 "To determine whether or not a marriage [has] completely broken down is
really not a triable issue. If the case were undefended and the petitioner maintained that he would never go back to his spouse, and that the marriage was
dead ... we do not see how the court could do otherwise than accept what he
said and grant a divorce."
MacKenna, Divorce by Consent and Divorce for Breakdown of Marriage, 30 MODERN L.
R v. 121, 128 (1967), quoting ROYAL COMMr'N ON MARRIAGE & DivoRcE, REPORT (1951-55),
at 21. See also MacKenna, supra at 130.
66 For example, the California Governor's Commission recommended that when
either party files a petition requesting the court to "inquire into the continuation of
the marriage," an "initial evaluative interview" should be held with the professional

staff "for the purpose of helping the parties to assess and understand their situation."
63, at 507. One of the stated
goals of such an interview is to amass "raw data about the real causes of marriage
failure." Id. at 508.
67 The California Governor's Commission apparently recognized the possibility of
judicial delay and thus recommended that despite court advisements those parties who
maintain their intention to divorce must eventually be granted a decree. Id. at 509.
But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 4508(a) (West 1970) which arguably leaves the ultimate question
of dissolution up to the discretion of the judge, regardless of the desires of the parties.
CAuroRNiA GovERNoR's COMM'N ON THE FAMILY, supra note
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IV
INNOVATIVE DIVORCE REFoRM PROPOSALS

A.

Contract Marriages

State courts have traditionally refused to enforce private marital
contracts that might "change the essential incidents of marriage" or
"facilitate a divorce. ' 68 Some courts have increasingly allowed the
parties to negotiate certain matters, such as property settlements 69
and, to some extent, alimony and other personal rights,7 0 in connection with a divorce, notwithstanding that such agreements may
"facilitate" marital dissolution. No private agreement, however, providing for the automatic termination of the marriage after a specified
interval or upon the mere desire of one or both of the parties has
yet been upheld. 71 The only attempt to create by legislation such contractual freedom was not only abortive but fraught with some of the
68 RsTATEMNT oF CoNTRACrs §§ 586, 587 (1932). See, e.g., French v. McAnarney, 290
Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935); Niman v. Niman, 15 Misc. 2d 1095, 181 N.Y.S.2d 260
(N.Y. County Ct. 1958), aff'd, 8 App. Div. 2d 793, 188 N.Y.S.2d 948 (1st Dep't 1959).
69 Courts have often allowed parties to enter into ante- and post-nuptial contracts
that specify property settlement rights in the event of divorce. In most cases the only restrictions put on these contracts are that the parties be fully aware of the legal ramifications of the agreement and that there be full disclosure of the properties involved. See,
e.g., Wright v. Wright, 148 Cal. App. 2d 257, 306 P.2d 586 (2d Dist. 1957); Hartz v. Hartz,
248 Md. 47, 284 A.2d 865 (1957); Kosik v. George, 253 Ore. 15, 452 P.2d 560 (1969).
Except in cases where the provision for the wife is grossly disproportionate to the
husband's means, or where the relationship between the parties is so confidential as to
give rise to suspicion, the burden of proof of fraud, duress, or inequity in the contract is
generally upon the party seeking to invalidate the agreement. See, e.g., Lightman v. Magid,
54 Tenn. App. 701, 394 S.W.2d 151 (1965). For example, the courts have distinguished
between contracts of young couples "in love," and of older couples whose acumen and
judgment are presumably less likely to be clouded by the emotions of tenderness and trust.
See, e.g., In re Davis, 20 N.Y.2d 70, 228 N.E.2d 768, 281 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1967).
70 See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Hudson v. Hudson, 850 P.2d
596 (Okla. 1960); Reiling v. Reiling, 463 P.2d 591, 2 Ore. App. 571 (1970).
71 "Even where all substantive requirements are concededly met, we know of no
instance where two consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate themselves from
the constraints of legal obligations that go with marriage . . . without invoking the
State's judicial machinery." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971). See note 68
supra.
Perhaps the closest a court has come to enforcing an agreement providing for the

automatic termination of marriage is Davis v. Davis, 191 A.2d 188 (D.C. 1963). The court
in Davis upheld an antenuptial agreement specifying that the sole purpose of the marriage was to give a child a name and that if the parties were not satisfied with the
marriage they could obtain a divorce. The court said that the agreement was only a
recognition of legal rights given by statute and granted the divorce on the grounds that
the parties had satisfied the requirements of a "living apart" statute.
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same undesirable attributes of state regulation that have characterized
other divorce laws and reforms. 72
In 1971 a proposal for the creation of three-year renewable "contract marriages" was introduced in the Maryland House of Delegates. 78
This proposal would, in effect, have reversed the polarities of traditional divorce law, requiring affirmative acts to continue a marriage
rather than to terminate it.74 It would have created a right marital
partners have never before possessed-the right to dissolve a marriage,
at least at specified intervals, without state interference. 75
The Maryland proposal is interesting in its contemplated reduction of the state's adjudicatory role in divorce and in its inventiveness
in applying contractual notions of a limited nature to the problems
of marital dissolution. Nevertheless, the proposal contained severe
faults. The specific proposal was poorly drafted and ambiguous. 76 In
addition, its overall thrust was authoritarian and presumptuous. Although the present fault system unfairly requires affirmative adversary
conduct to dissolve a marriage, it is equally unfair to require that the
parties take affirmative action at arbitrarily specified times to avoid
marriage termination. In both systems the state has neither shown much
respect for individual needs nor retreated from the premise that it must
72 See notes 73-78 and accompanying text infra.
78 (1971) H. No. 63 (Mss. Lee &cBoswell) [hereinafter cited as Marriage Bill] was
introduced on February 29, 1971 and referred to the judiciary committee. The proposal
died in committee.
74 The central provision of the proposal stated:

Any marriage performed in this State ... may be a contract of marriage for
the term of three (8) years. The contract at the end of that period of time shall
be subject to renewal for an additional three (8) year period.
Id. § S1A(b).
75 See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
76 The proposal was unclear as to whether a party could unilaterally terminate the
marriage. It stated that if one party refuses to renew at the end of any three-year interval,
the other "agreeable" party may obtain a judicial determination of such specified matters
as alimony and child support. Marriage Bill §§ 31A(b) (1), (2). Although not specifically
stated, by implication the other party could not prevent the termination of the marriage,
but might only petition for a determination of collateral matters.
If the proposal was in fact intended to require mutual consent before nonjudicial
dissolution were available, in cases of unilateral refusal to renew the parties would be
relegated to Maryland's existing divorce procedures. The bill specifically stated that it
would supplement Maryland's existing divorce law (MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (Supp.
(1971) (divorce a vinculo)), a fault-oriented adjudicatory system. Marriage Bill § 31A(a).
Assuming the proposal allows for unilateral dissolution, it inferentially and arbitrarily
assigns fault to the nonrenewing spouse by divesting him or her of any right to alimony,
maintenance, or other support. Id. §§ 31A(b)(1), (2). The "fault" in this system is thus
not a specific offense against the marriage, but rather the initial desire to terminate the
marriage. It seems slightly incongruous to advocate a system of periodically renewable
marriages only to punish a failure to renew.
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necessarily play an active role in determining when a marriage may be
dissolved. A statutory prescription of marital duration, no matter what
the specified term, will be arbitrary in individual cases. A marriage
should be legally terminated when its emotional underpinnings no
longer exist, not when the state or the parties predict that those underpinnings will-or should-have dissolved~7 A state-imposed marital
contract of arbitrary duration provides no rational alternative to an78
tiquated divorce laws.
B.

Registration Divorce

Registration divorce, or "divorce on demand,"7 9 which includes
both unilateral and consensual dissolution, is regarded as the most
radical of possible divorce reforms.8 0 Although a registration divorce
system may make provision for the separate judicial or administrative
determination of matters collateral to the divorce8 l (and indeed must
do so to avoid inequity), its central concept is that the divorce itself
will be granted if one or both of the parties formally requests it. The
77 The force of these objections may be undermined by the language of another
marriage bill introduced in 1972. (1972) H. No. 42 (Ms. Lee). Although substantially
duplicating the language of the 1971 proposal and suffering from some of the same
ambiguity (note 76 supra), the 1972 bill makes clear that although Maryland marriages
may be three-year contract marriages, they are not required to be. (1972) H. No. 42,
§ 31A(b). In other words, the three-year marriage would be optional rather than
mandatory.
78 Indeed, it may be that contractual concepts are inapplicable in the area of divorce.
Concepts of duress, waiver, breach, and damages, for example, would necessarily assume
new meanings if removed from a commercial setting and applied to the subtle, emotional
problems of marital dissolution.
79 A detailed treatment of this system is found in Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 26.
80 The concept of consensual dissolution of marriage is generally an unpopular one.
See, e.g., W. FRIEMANN, supra note 4, at 222; Neumark & Levinson, Marital Law in a
Changing Society, 57 ILL. B.J. 902, 906 (1969). For an examination of the Soviet experience
with "divorce on demand," see J. HAzaD & I. SHArPIo, THE Sovirr LEGAL SYSTEm pt. 8,
at 99-102 (1962).
Proponents of registration divorce contend that it would only reflect in law what
occurs in reality, since most divorce actions are uncontested. See generally Goldstein &
Gitter, supra note 26, at 80; see also Foster, supra note 14, at 113. This assertion is perhaps
misleading. An uncontested divorce may indicate that both parties in fact desire to
terminate the marriage. However, it may also be the result of prolonged bitter negotiations
in which a reluctant partner threatens to contest the action in order to extort a favorable
financial settlement. The adjudicatory tenor of divorce proceedings encourages such

"bargaining." In other words, the prevalence of uncontested divorce actions does not
necessarily mean that one party commonly accedes to the other's wishes or that registration divorces would duplicate present reality for the reluctant spouse.
81 The concept of a "divisible divorce," in which matters such as alimony, child
support, and property settlement are determined independently of the divorce proceeding,
is not novel. See, e.g., May v. Anderson, 845 U.S. 528 (1953); Estin v. Estin, 834 U.S. 541
(1948).
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system thus reserves no adjudicatory role for the state; the state performs a mere clerical function, formalizing the death of a marriage
rather than deciding whether or when to permit it. Registration divorce has so far failed to obtain the serious consideration of either
commentators or lawmakers,8 2 yet, considering the present status of
divorce reform and social mores in this country, 83 it is emerging as a
defensible, if not yet politically acceptable, divorce reform alternative.
The criticisms of a "divorce on demand" system stress its potentially harmful effects both on the marital partners and society. 4 Any
attempt at divorce reform, however, is invariably countered by arguments that the removal of legal barriers to dissolution will necessarily
increase the incidence of divorce,8 r encourage interspousal intimida82 Cantor, The Right to Divorce, AT 'ric MONTHLY,Nov. 1966, at 67, and Goldstein
& Gitter, supra note 26, seem to be the only exceptions to this statement. Even when
both parties consent, registration divorce is anathema to most reformers. The Archbishop
of Canterbury's divorce reform group stated that the "breakdown" system which it proposed "would not involve 'divorce by consent' in the sense of divorce granted automatically
32 (emphasis added).
on proof that the parties agree in wanting it." PurriNG AsuNERa
The California Governor's Commission, in advocating adoption of the breakdown principle,
noted that it could not "overemphasize that [the breakdown] standard does not permit
divorce by consent." CALIFORNIA GoVERNoR's COMM'N ON = FAMILY, supra note 63, at 509.
83 See notes 10-14 and accompanying text supra.
84 "'If husband and wife were free to terminate their marriage at pleasure, then
marriage would become a purely contractual relationship and the interests of the community would receive no recognition."' MacKenna, supra note 65, at 132, quoting ROYAL
COaMM'N ON MARRIAGE & DIVORCE, REPORT (1951-55), at 15.
There is . . . considerable justification for the view that the availability of divorce by consent would tempt married couples to magnify temporary disagreement, discomfort or other difficulties into basic failure. There is much experience
to show that patience, continuous effort and growing maturity can remedy many
situations which, in the agony of the moment, appear beyond repair.
W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 4, at 222. See also Kahn-Freund, Divorce Law Reform?, 19
MODERN L. REv. 573, 583-84 (1956).
The traumatic effect of divorce on children as contrasted to the negative effects of
continual marital discord has been examined extensively. See generally Burchinal,
Characteristics of Adolescents from Unbroken, Broken, and Reconstituted Families, 26
J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 44 (1964); Nye, Child Adjustment in Broken and Unhappy Unbroken Homes, 19 MARRIAGE & FAMILY ITVING 356 (1957).
85 For example, approximately 30% of those who file divorce petitions withdraw them
before the divorce becomes final. Foster, Procrustes and the Couch, 2 J. FAMILY L. 85, 91
(1962). Under a registration system, however, there would be no opportunity for reflection and withdrawal. But cf. Irvine, Report of the Mortimer Group on Divorce Law,
30 MODERN L. Rxv. 72, 73 (1967):
Those members of the Royal Commission who had set their faces against axiy
extension of the grounds for divorce thought that if divorce was made easier
more marriages would fail. It is surprising they did not contend that divorce
should be made harder to obtain, for then on their argument marriages should
become more stable. And where there is no divorce at all the institution of marriage should be most secure of alll ... Certainly it is wrong to parade the divorce rate as proof positive of a decline in moral standards and an increase in the
number of "broken homes." In fact we do not know whether the proportion of
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tion,8 6 discourage alternate and more constructive methods for solving
marital problems,8 7 and generally weaken the marital bond and
cheapen the status of being married. Speculation about the social effects of divorce reform seems as inconclusive as it is endless.
The faith of the reformer, however, rests on a series of simple
premises. (1) The viability of marital relationship and the possibility
of reconciliation can most validly and least offensively be explored and
determined by the parties themselves. (2) The majority of those who
marry intend, at least initially, that the relationship will be "for life."
This intention is not likely to be altered by divorce reform. Couples
today are certainly aware that divorce is available, 8 but only rarely
do they consider the specifics of divorce law until after an intention
to dissolve the marital bond has been solidly embraced. (3) Since the
preservation of unsuccessful marriages can have little beneficial effect
on the parties, their children, or society in general, social interests are
in fact injured rather than served by divorce restrictions.8 9 (4) Whatever the undesirable changes in individual behavior that may be encouraged by liberalized divorce laws,90 they must be measured against
broken homes has risen markedly over the years. A question that cries out for

inquiry is whether the availability of a particular divorce remedy is ever the
cause of the breakdown of a marriage, or no more than the means of release from
a marriage that has broken down.
86 A registration divorce system admittedly might facilitate one partner's efforts to
intimidate or dominate the other, or to mold the marriage to his own desires by constantly threatening divorce. On the other hand, the present fault system clearly encourages
one partner to intimidate the other by threatening to contest a divorce. Psychological
intimidation is thus a threat in both systems and to some degree unavoidable in any
dependency relationship such as marriage.
87 "[1It is argued that if divorce were made easier there would be much less in-

centive to overcome such difficulties as arise in most married lives." MacKenna, supra
note 65, at 133. For a criticism of this view, see Note, supra note 26, at 625.
Conciliation procedures, such as those established in Iowa (IowA CODE ANN. § 598.16
(Supp. 1971)), allow the court to require the parties who wish a divorce to attend
counseling sessions to attempt resolution of their differences. The value of such conciliation services is debatable. Compare Seidelson, Systematic Marriage Investigation and
Counseling in Divorce Cases: Some Reflections on Its ConstitutionalPropriety and General
Desirability,36 Gao. WAsH. L. Rav. 60, 89-94 (1967), with Foster, Conciliationand Counsel-

ing in the Courts in Family Law Cases, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 353, 381 (1966).
88 "[F]airly easy availability of divorce has become part of the consciousness of the
people." Bodenheimer, supra note 26, at 187.
89 See generally Note, supra note 26, 1970 LAw & SocmaL ORDER at 624-25.
90 One British sociologist questions what effect, if any, divorce law has on individual behavior: "'[MIn the areas of sexual and familial life it is reasonable to assume that
the law has far less effect on behaviour than lawyers appear to think."' MacKenna, supra
note 65, at 131, quoting PutrrINo AsuNDER app. F, 10 (statement of Prof. Donald MacRae,
University of London). See W. FRimEmN, supra note 4, at 223, where the author states
that there is not "the slightest evidence in the social or economic moral state of con-
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the benefits of eliminating the evils of the current divorce system 9 and
against the salutary effect of closing the gap between legal theory and
92
social practice in contemporary divorces.
These tenets, to varying degrees, constitute the rationale of all
modern divorce reform. Logic, however, compels a more drastic restructuring than has actually been implemented in recent reforms.
Registration divorce seems to achieve the reformer's goals while avoid-

ing the pitfalls which characterize existing reforms. Both incompatibility and breakdown statutes involve substantial problems. 93 In
practice, increased judicial discretion may lead to increased state interference in the divorce process. Yet narrowly defined criteria for divorce,
as in the fault system and separation statutes, overlook the uniqueness
of each marital relationship and inevitably lead to parties tailoring

circumstances to fit legislatively or judicially defined criteria. 94
The volitional element in registration divorce, however, is regarded by many as the system's fatal flaw.95 "Divorce by consent," as
well as the more radical concept of unilateral divorce by registration,
has traditionally been strongly condemned in domestic relations
law. 6 In practice, however, consensual divorces are not prevented
temporary Western society to assume that the maintenance of a strict law would lead
to a change in social facts." See also Irvine, supra note 85.
91 "The law of divorce has ... become a mockery throughout the modem Western
world." W. FaREMMNN, supra note 4, at 223. See also notes 25-34 and accompanying text
supra.
92 See notes 14 & 17 supra.
93 See notes 35-40 & 54-67 and accompanying text supra.
94 See notes 10-14 and accompanying text supra.
95 The feared situation, perhaps atypical, involves an aging, financially dependent
wife of many years powerless to prevent her husband (usually adulterous) from obtaining
a divorce. Yet the wife's situation may not be one deserving sympathy. To a degree,
emotional injury is an inevitable risk in any personal relationship. In addition, a unilateral volitional divorce is not really "unfair" to the unconsenting spouse. if one marital partner makes the considered decision that the relationship should be terminated
perhaps it may properly be said that the marital relationship has broken down. There
seems no inequity in depriving the wife of a right to continue legal formalities as long
as she has collateral recourse to retain the substantive incidents of the relationship, such
as financial support, after the relationship per se has been terminated. See note 81 supra.
The law cannot force a husband to cohabit with his wife; a wife's loss in a unilateral
divorce system would be only of her legal status, not necessarily of the emotional and
physical incidents of that status, and likewise not necessarily of the financial incidents
of that status if collateral procedures are available. Admittedly the loss of legal status
may, in some cases, also be an emotional loss, but the husband also suffers an emotional
burden of sorts when a marriage he desires dissolved is preserved.
In addition, there is an inconsistency between this nearly universal aversion to unilateral divorce and the substantial number of separation statutes which in effect allow
delayed unilateral dissolution.
96 See notes 82-86 and accompanying text supra.
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when the grounds for marital dissolution are rigidly prescribed by
law; rather, such divorces merely bear a higher price tag and sometimes require minimal ingenuity on the part of the spouses in fabricating "grounds." Moreover, modem no-fault living apart statutes
make the consent of the parties-to live apart for the prescribed time
to satisfy the statutory requirements for divorce-a valid basis for a
97
divorce decree.
Building on the living apart concept, it is but a short step, in
theory at least, to substitute either the unilateral or consensual act
of filing for divorce for that of living apart for a specified time as sufficient evidence of marital breakdown to justify divorce.98 The uniqueness of each marriage would be recognized, the decisions of the parties
with regard to the viability of their relationship respected, and the
investigatory problems involved in the administration of any system
based on specific criteria, narrowly or broadly defined, obviated.
CONCLUSION

Domestic relations constitutes one of the most important and complex legal areas, involving as it does both legal rights and duties and
strong personal interests and emotions. Divorce reform must seek to
consider fully the emotional complexities of the marital relationship.
Admittedly the objectionable features of present divorce law are not
subject to easy remedy. Registration divorce, even if not currently politically acceptable, may constitute an enlightened and rational accommodation of state authority and individual marital freedom. The
groundwork for its eventual implementation has, in part, been laid,
since some existing reforms reflect an underlying theory that is perfectly compatible with a registration divorce system. Only actual experimentation can prove-or disprove-the claims of its detractors.
Donna J. Zenor
97 See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
98 The relationship between living apart statutes and registration divorce schemes

becomes more obvious when, as was proposed by Goldstein and Gitter (Goldstein & Gitter,
supra note 26), a waiting period aimed at preventing precipitous divorce decisions is
imposed between the filing of a divorce petition and the issuance of the divorce decree.
Goldstein and Gitter propose a six-month waiting period with a reduction to three months
if the parties agree on ancillary matters such as alimony, property settlement, and child
custody. Id. at 90. Such a period admittedly might promote deliberation and reconsideration on the part of the spouses. However, to a degree the imposition of a waiting

period is contrary to the basic assumptions of the registration divorce concept. Furthermore, the inequities of "migratory divorce" may be overcome only if the waiting period
is no longer than the shortest state residency requirement for obtaining a divorce.

